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The German Headscarf Debate
Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen*

†

I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly twenty years ago, teachers employed by the state in
Germany began to wear the reddish-colored clothing of the
Bhagwan (Osho) religious movement in obligatory state schools,
thus silently yet highly visibly advertising for their religious
community, which at that time was still considered a “youth sect”
[Jugendsekte]. Many courts at the time prohibited this activity
without much controversy.1 In contrast, with its Headscarf Decision2

* Professor von Campenhausen is a member of the Law Faculty of the University of
Göttingen and specializes in public law, church law, church-state law, and foundation law
[Stiftungsrecht]. This Article is reproduced in similar form in German in MATERIALDIENST DES
KONFESSIONSKUNDLICHEN INSTITUTS IN BENSHEIM (Spring, 2004).
† Translated from German by John B. Fowles, B.A., Brigham Young University;
M.St., University of Oxford; J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
The following list of abbreviations provides the uniform abbreviation and the
English approximation for each German legal periodical and other select sources cited in this
Article.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BVerfGE
Entscheidungen des
Decisions of the Federal Constitutional
Bundesverfassungsgerichts
Court
BVerwGE
Entscheidungen des
Decisions of the Federal Administrative
Bundesverwaltungsgerichts
Court
DVBL.
DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT
GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE GAZETTE
PROTESTANT NEWS SERVICE
EPD
EVANGELISCHER PRESSEDIENST
DOKUMENTATION
DOCUMENTATION
ESSEN DISCUSSIONS ON THE TOPIC OF
ESSENER GESPRÄCHE ZUM THEMA
ESSGESPR.
STAAT UND KIRCHE
CHURCH AND STATE
BASIC LAW (FEDERAL CONSTITUTION)
GG
GRUNDGESETZ
JURIST’S JOURNAL
JZ
JURISTENZEITUNG
KUR
KIRCHE UND RECHT
CHURCH AND LAW
NEW JURIDICAL WEEKLY
NJW
NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT
NEW JOURNAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
NVWZ
VERWALTUNGSRECHT
ADMINISTRATIVE GAZETTE FOR BADENVERWALTUNGSBLÄTTER FÜR
VBLBW
BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG
WÜRTTEMBERG
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of September 24, 2003, the German Federal Constitutional Court
has unleashed an avalanche of controversy; that is, the court has
needlessly raised a difficult political dispute. Specifically, although the
court ruled that a prohibition on a Muslim teacher from wearing a
headscarf—which has previously been held valid3—is indeed
theoretically permissible, the court nevertheless declared the specific
legal regulation at issue insufficient4 and therefore mandated elected
legislatures to create a “sufficiently clear legal basis”5 on which to
justify such a limitation of religious freedom, yet provided them with
no guidance in doing so.
In Germany—a country largely unshaken by religious conflicts
and where every individual enjoys full religious freedom under an
overall satisfactorily functioning rule of law—the court has spoken in
terms of religious freedom in the debate about the headscarf of a
Muslim school teacher.6 In holding the administrative regulation

JOURNAL OF CIVIL SERVICE LAW
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
BEAMTENRECHT
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EVANGELISCHES JOURNAL OF PROTESTANT CHURCH LAW
ZEVKR
KIRCHENRECHT
1. See, e.g., Oberverwaltungsgericht Hamburg [OVG Hamburg] [Hamburg High
Administrative Court], NVWZ 1986, 406; Bayerischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof [Bay VGH]
[Bavarian Court of Administrative Appeals], NVwZ 1986, 405; see also AXEL FRHR. VON
CAMPENHAUSEN, STAATSKIRCHENRECHT [THE LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE] 72 (3d ed.
1996) [hereinafter VON CAMPENHAUSEN, LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE]; 3 AXEL FRHR. VON
CAMPENHAUSEN, GRUNDGESETZKOMMENTAR [COMMENTARY ON THE BASIC LAW] art. 136
(Weimarer Reichsverfassung [WRV] [The Constitution of the Weimar Republic]) n.34
(Mangoldt, Klein & Starck eds., 4th ed. 2001).
2. Kopftuch-Urteil [Headscarf Decision] (Sept. 24, 2003), BVerfGE 108, 282,
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], NJW 56 (2003), 3111, 2
BvR 1436/02, http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20030603_2bvr143602.html.
3. Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court], NJW 55
(2002), 3344 (upholding the administrative prohibition on teachers wearing a headscarf in
public state schools); Verwaltungsgerichtshof Baden-Württemberg [VGH BadenWürttemberg] [Baden-Württemberg Court of Administrative Appeals], NJW 54 (2001), 2899
(upholding the administrative decision prohibiting teachers from wearing a headscarf while
teaching).
4. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (303), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3114), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 49.
5. Id.
6. The headscarf problem can surface anywhere. For information concerning this issue
in employment in the civil service (e.g., a school teacher), compare the situation in Germany,
Oberverwaltungsgericht Lüneburg [VG Lüneburg] [Lüneburg High Administrative Court],
ZEVKR 48 (2003), 219, and the decision below, Verwaltungsgericht Lüneburg [VG
Lüneburg] [Lüneburg Administrative Trial Court], NJW 54 (2001), 767, with the situation in
Switzerland, Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447, reported in German
ZBR
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prohibiting a Muslim school teacher, as a civil servant, from wearing
a headscarf while teaching insufficient, the court nullified all related
regulations immediately, with no transitional period.7 Now, laws in
each of Germany’s sixteen federal states [Bundesländer or Länder]
must be amended if a particular state’s law does not declare directly
that the state [Bundesland or Land] prefers not to legislate on
whether a Muslim teacher may or may not wear a headscarf while
teaching, as in the case of the Land Northrhine-Westphalia.8 In
response to the Headscarf Decision, the Länder BadenWürttemberg, Bavaria, and Lower Saxony have already submitted or
announced draft laws to provide a legal basis for prohibiting teachers
from wearing headscarves while teaching.
Prominent public figures—not jurists but experienced politicians
who are also authorities on religion—have entered the constitutional
fray, speaking against a prohibition on headscarves. For example,
Hans Maier, the former Bavarian Minister of Education
[Kultusminister], has supported the integration of Muslims in
society through upbringing and education since the 1970s.9 In this
effort, he has strived to promote dialogue in schools and colleges

translation in Europäischer Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte [EGMR] [European Court of
Human Rights], NJW 54 (2001), 2871. For employment relationships outside of the civil
service (e.g., a saleswoman), compare BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court], NJW 56 (2003),
2815, and the decision below, Bundesarbeitsgericht [BAG] [Federal Employment Court],
NJW 56 (2003), 1685, with Landesarbeitsgericht Hessen [LAG Hessen] [Hessen State
Employment Court], NJW 54 (2001), 3650. For the issue of presenting personal identification
documents with or without head coverings for both foreigners and German citizens, see
Verwaltungsgerichtshof München [VGH München] [Munich Court of Administrative
Appeals], NVWZ 2000, 952, and Verwaltungsgericht Berlin [VG Berlin] [Berlin Administrative
Trial Court], NVWZ 1990, 100.
7. Cf. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (338), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3121), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 133 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting).
8. The Land Northrhine-Westphalia has expressly opted for a tolerant stance towards
Muslim teachers wearing a headscarf while teaching. Mal Hü, mal Hott [First One Thing, Then
Another], SPIEGEL ONLINE, Oct. 3, 2003, at http://www.spiegel.de/unispiegel/
stadium/0,1518,268138,00.htm (on file with the BYU Law Review). That is, the Land has
declined to legislate even though there are currently at least fifteen teachers in the Land who
wear a headscarf while teaching. Id. The Land Minister of Education [Schulministerin], Ute
Schäfer, a Social Democrat, has explained that wearing a headscarf while teaching has never led
to a conflict within the school, stating that “this is a sign of the high degree of toleration of
people in our Bundesland.” Id. (“Ich glaube, dass dies auch ein Zeichen der großen Toleranz
der Menschen in unserem Bundesland ist.”).
9. Hans Maier, Editorial, Zwischen Kopftuch, Kita und Kreuz [Between Headscarf,
Kippah and Crucifix], RHEINISCHER MERKUR, Jan. 8, 2004, at 26, available at
http://www.merkur.de/archiv/neu/rm_0402/po/fdzindex.html.
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between the “Children of Abraham”10 who, despite their common
roots, are all so different from each other. That is why he could
“only be horrified at this blind zeal”11 behind the drive for a renewed
prohibition following the Headscarf Decision. Maier is against a
renewed prohibition on headscarves because he fears the undesired
consequences it would have for all religious symbols.12 According to
Maier, nothing is as important as equality in a secular state.13
Especially the younger generation of judges has learned this lesson,
asserts Maier.14 Furthermore, much like the Federal Constitutional
Court,15 Maier also pointed to the variety of interpretations of the
headscarf:
[T]he headscarf does not have one single interpretation; rather, it
can mean many things (as it did until recently for our own mothers,
grandmothers, and aunts!): it can be an expression of tradition,
heritage, religious affiliation but also a sign of sexual unavailability,
a freely chosen way . . . to lead a self-determined life without
breaking with cultural heritage.16

Johannes Rau, the Federal President of Germany, has expressed a
similar conclusion on the Headscarf Decision in public. First, the
Federal President demanded in news interviews that the Islamic
headscarf and a Christian amulet be treated equally as the Länder
work out their new legislative schemes for prohibiting the headscarf
following the Headscarf Decision.17 Then, using a celebration in

10. Id.
11. Id.; see also Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, Editorial, Noch einmal: das Kopftuch,
RHEINISCHER MERKUR, Jan. 12, 2004, at 26, available at http://www.merkur.de/archiv/
neu/rm_0407/po/fdzindex.html.
12. Maier, supra note 9, at 26.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (298–99), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3114), 2
BvR 1436/02, paras. 50–52.
16. Maier, supra note 9, at 26 (“Das Kopftuch ist nämlich nicht eindeutig, es kann für
vieles stehen (wie es auch bei unseren Müttern, Großmüttern und Tanten vor kurzem noch für
vieles stand!): Es kann ein Ausdruck für Tradition, Herkunft, religiöse Bindung sein aber auch
ein Zeichen für sexuelle Nichtverfügbarkeit, ein frei gewähltes Mittel . . . , um ohne Bruch mit
der Herkunftskultur ein selbstbestimmtes Leben zu führen.”) (omission in original).
17. See Interview with President Johannes Rau, BERLIN DIREKT (Television Station
ZDF), Dec. 28. 2003, selections reprinted in EPD 4/2004, at 12 (on file with the BYU Law
Review); Interview with President Johannes Rau, WELT AM SONNTAG [WORLD ON SUNDAY],
Jan. 4, 2004, selections reprinted in EPD 4/2004, at 12–13 (on file with the BYU Law
Review).
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Wolfenbüttel of the 275th birthday of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing18
as an occasion to reiterate his original demand, President Rau took
the surprising approach of explaining that religious freedom is
guaranteed to all Germans19—a proposition that does not seem to
have been called into question.20 As had Maier, President Rau made
18. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–81)—a thinker, author, and aesthete of the
German Enlightenment—explored the brotherhood of man and the possible harmony of the
three great religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam in his last play, Nathan der Weise
[Nathan the Wise] (1779), a “dramatic poem” expressing Lessing’s own “enlightened
humanitarianism,” F.J. LAMPORT, GERMAN CLASSICAL DRAMA 64 (1990), and his concern
with “the essential unity of all true religions and the falsity of religious bigotry,” id. at 69.
Writing from Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, the small German principality where he served as court
librarian from 1770 until his death in 1781, Lessing wrote Nathan the Wise as a rejection of
“literal obedience to the dictates of any religion, be it Christianity, Judaism, or Islam.” Id. at
71. In this work, however, Lessing acknowledges that “an enlightened knowledge of the need
for human brotherhood is not sufficient to bring such brotherhood about.” BENJAMIN
BENNETT, MODERN DRAMA & GERMAN CLASSICISM: RENAISSANCE FROM LESSING TO
BRECHT 82 (1979). Rather, deeds are needed. Cf. IMMANUEL KANT, CONFLICT OF THE
FACULTIES [DER STREIT DER FAKULTÄTEN] 71 (Mary J. Gregor trans. & ed., 1992) (1798)
(“The only thing that matters in religion is deeds.”).
19. Johannes Rau, Speech in Wolfenbüttel on the 275th Birthday of Gotthold Ephraim
Lessing (Jan. 22, 2004), pt. V, para. 9 [hereinafter Speech in Wolfenbüttel], available at
http://www.bundespraesident.de/top/dokumente/Rede/ix_94041.htm.
20. One of the most well-known aspects of Lessing’s Nathan the Wise is the famous
“Ring Parable” [Ringparabel], which bears mention here because President Rau was alluding
to its teachings on religious toleration by addressing the headscarf debate in a speech
commemorating Lessing’s 275th birthday. In Nathan the Wise, a Christian Templar, Nathan
the Jew, and the Muslim Sultan Saladin realize their familial relationship to each other. The
“centerpiece” of this development is the Ring Parable. LAMPORT, supra note 18, at 70.
Attempting to press Nathan the Jew into lending him money, Saladin the Sultan asks Nathan
to tell him which religion is true because “[o]f these three Religions only one can be the true
one.” GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSING, NATHAN THE WISE, MINNA VON BARNHELM, AND
OTHER PLAYS AND WRITINGS act 3, sc. 5, at 230 (Peter Demetz trans. & ed.), in 12 THE
GERMAN LIBRARY (Volkmar Sander ed., 1991). Instead of answering the Sultan’s question
directly, Nathan the Jew wisely relates the Ring Parable:
In days of yore, there dwelt in eastern lands/ A man who had a ring of priceless
worth/ Received from hands beloved. The stone it held,/ An opal, shed a hundred
colors fair,/ And had the magic power that he who wore it,/ Trusting its strength,
was loved of God and men./ No wonder therefore that this eastern man/ Would
never cease to wear it; and took pains/ To keep it in his household for all time./ He
left the ring to that one of his sons/ He loved the best; providing that in turn/ That
son bequeath to his most favorite son/ The ring; and thus, regardless of his birth,/
The dearest son, by virtue of the ring,/ Should be the head, the prince of all his
house. . . ./ At last this ring, passed on from son to son,/ Descended to a father of
three sons;/ All three of whom were duly dutiful,/ All three of whom in
consequence he needs/ Must love alike. . . ./ Then came the time/ For dying, and
the loving father finds/ Himself embarrassed. . . ./ He sends/ In secret to a jeweler,
of whom/ He orders two more rings, in pattern like/ His own, and bids him spare
nor cost nor toil/ To make them in all points identical./ The jeweler succeeds. . . ./
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comments about possible interpretations of the headscarf,
concluding that the possible misuse of an object cannot be allowed
to inhibit its proper use.21 Above all, he rejected a perceived growing
laicism that, in his opinion, resulted from a headscarf prohibition for
teachers.22 On Lessing’s grave, President Rau called for toleration23
and at the same time refuted the draft laws prepared in several
Bundesländer prohibiting Muslim teachers from wearing the
headscarf.24 In President Rau’s view, one cannot forbid one religious
symbol and maintain the status quo for everything else:25 “That is
not compatible with the religious freedom which our Basic Law
guarantees all people and would therefore open the gate to a
development that most proponents of a headscarf prohibition do not
want.”26 In essence, the prohibition, according to President Rau,

In glee and joy he calls his sons to him,/ Each by himself, confers on him his
blessing—/ His ring as well—and dies.
Id. act 3, sc. 7, at 231–32. After the death of the father, the three sons dispute among
themselves who has the true ring, which makes its possessor beloved of God and men. Id. To
resolve this conflict, the three brothers appear before a judge whom they ask to determine
which brother has the true ring. Id. But to the surprise of the three brothers, the judge finds
that “O then you are, all three, deceived deceivers,” on the basis that none of the brothers
exhibits the type of moral action characteristic of the bearer of the true ring. Id. at 234. The
judge does not leave it at that, however, and proposes a solution to the problem:
Let each strive/ To match the rest in bringing to the fore/ The magic of the opal in
his ring!/ Assist that power with all humility,/ With benefaction, hearty
peacefulness,/ And with profound submission to God’s will!/ And when the magic
powers of the stones/ Reveal themselves in children’s children’s children:/ I bid
you, in a thousand thousand years,/ To stand again before this seat.
Id. at 235. This exposition of the Ring Parable reveals President Rau’s misplaced agenda in
using his speech honoring Lessing as an opportunity to enter the political fray of the headscarf
debate. That is, an appeal to religious toleration on Lessing’s grave meant to reinforce the
assertion that religious freedom is guaranteed to all in Germany does not address the real issue:
whether a civil servant’s status as a representative of the state subjects the civil servant to
demands of state neutrality in matters of religion at the expense of a certain degree of that civil
servant’s constitutionally guaranteed religious freedom. See infra Parts II.C and III.B for a
treatment of the dissent’s correct view in the Headscarf Case that a civil servant who
voluntarily enters into this representative relationship with the state needs to be willing, in
order to be qualified for the job, to relinquish some degree of religious freedom in the interest
of the state’s religious neutrality.
21. Speech in Wolfenbüttel, supra note 19, pt. VIII, paras. 4–5.
22. Id. pt. XI, para. 5.
23. Id. pt. VI, para. 9.
24. Id. pt. III, para. 1.
25. Id. pt. XI, para. 4.
26. Id.
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would cause an even clearer separation of church and state in
Germany.27
A flood of academic treatments28 of the issue that cannot be
overlooked suggests that foundational questions must first be
debated before the headscarf prohibition can be enacted through
27. Id. pt. XI, para. 5.
28. See, e.g., Bertrams, Lehrerin mit Kopftuch? Islamismus des Grundgesetzes [Teacher
with a Headscarf? The Islamism of the Basic Law], DVBL. 2003, 1225; Ernst-Wolfgang
Böckenförde, „Kopftuchstreit” auf dem richtigen Weg? [“Kopftuchstreit” in the Right Way?],
NJW 54 (2001), 723; Debus, Machen Kleider wirklich Leute? – Warum der „Kopftuch-Streit” so
„spannend” ist [Do Clothes Really Make the Person?—Why the “Kopftuch-Streit” is so “Exciting”],
NVWZ 2001, 1355; Klaas Engelken, Anmerkung zum Urteil des BVerfG vom 24.9.2003
[Commentary on the Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Sept. 24, 2003], DVBL.
2003, 1539; Helmut Goerlich, Religionspolitische Distanz und kulturelle Vielfalt unter dem
Regime des Art. 9 EMRK [Religio-politico Distance and Cultural Diversity Under the Regime of
Art. 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights], NJW 54 (2001), 2862; Goos, Kruzifix
und Kopftuch—Anmerkungen zur Religionsfreiheit von Lehrerinnen und Lehrern [Crucifix and
Headscarf—Comments on the Religious Freedom of Teachers], ZBR 2003, 221; Halfmann, Der
Streit um die „Lehrerin mit Kopftuch” [The Conflict Surrounding the “Teacher with a
Headscarf”], NVWZ 2000, 862; Hans Michael Heinig & Martin Morlok, Von Schafen und
Kopftüchern [Of Sheep and Headscarves], JZ 58 (2003), 777; Ipsen, Karlsruhe locuta, causa
non finite, NVWZ 2003, 1210; Karl-Hermann Kästner, Anmerkung zum Urteil des BVerfG
vom 24.9.2003 [Commentary on the Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Sept. 24,
2003], JZ 58 (2003), 1178; Sacksofsky, Die Kopftuch-Entscheidung—von der religiösen zur
föderalen Vielfalt [The Headscarf Decision—from Religious to Federal Diversity], NJW 56
(2003), 3297; Winter, Die Kopftuchentscheidung—Das Bundesverfassungsgerichtsurteil in der
öffentlichen Debatte [The Headscarf Decision—The Federal Constitutional Court Decision in
Public Debate], KUR 2003, 129; see also JEAND’HEUR & KORIOTH, GRUNDZÜGE DES
STAATSKIRCHENRECHTS [PRINCIPLES OF CHURCH-STATE LAW] n.130 (2000); Jestaedt,
Grundrechtsschutz vor staatlich aufgedrängter Ansicht. Das Kopftuch der Lehrerin als Exempel
[Protection of Fundamental Rights Against State Imposed Beliefs. The Teacher’s Headscarf as an
Example], in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR JOSEPH LISTL 259 (1999); Karl-Hermann Kästner, Religiös
akzentuierte Kleidung des Lehrpersonals staatlicher Schulen [Religiously Accentuated Clothing of
the Teaching Staff at State Schools], in HECKEL FESTSCHRIFT 359 (1999); Karl-Hermann
Kästner, Religiöse und weltanschauliche Bezüge in der staatlichen Schule [References to Religious
and World Views at State Schools], in OPPERMANN FESTSCHRIFT 827 (2001); Korioth,
Commentary on Art. 140 of the Basic Law and Art. 136 of the Weimar Constitution, in
GRUNDGESETZ [BASIC LAW] marginal note 61 (Maunz & Dürig eds., 2003); Lothar Michael,
Anmerkung zum Urteil des BVerwG vom 4.7.2002 [Comments on the Federal Constitutional
Court Decision of July 4, 2002], JZ 58 (2003) 256; Martin Morlok & Krüper, Auf dem Weg
zum „forum neutrum”? – Die „Kopftuch-Entscheidung” des BVerwG [On the Way to the “Forum
Neutrum”?—The “Headscarf Decision” of the Federal Constitutional Court], NJW 56 (2003),
1020; Muckel, Gleicher Zugang zu jedem öffentlichen Amte – auch für muslimische Lehrerinnen
mit Kopftuch? [Equal Access to Every Civil Office—Also for Muslim Teachers Wearing
Headscarves?], in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR CHRISTOPH LINK 331 (2003); Müller-Elschner, Zum
Kopftuchstreit in Frankreich [On the Headscarf Debate in France], VBLBW 2003, 342;
Thüsing, Vom Kopftuch als Angriff auf die Vertragsfreiheit [On the Headscarf as Attack on the
Freedom of Contract], NJW 56 (2003), 405; Zacharias, Der Streit um das Kopftuch [The Debate
About the Headscarf], KUR 2002, 115.
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new laws in the Länder. Such high academic attention has not been
forthcoming since the Crucifix Decision29 of the same court. But the
new decision looks like it will be more readily accepted than was the
Crucifix Decision.30 This Article examines some of these
foundational questions, explaining why the basic reasoning of the
majority opinion in the Headscarf Decision was significantly flawed.
Part II critically discusses the majority and dissenting opinions in the
Headscarf Decision. Part III first analyzes the reasoning of the
majority opinion in holding the regulatory prohibition on wearing a
headscarf while teaching insufficient, and then concludes that the
dissenting opinion was correct in supporting the administrative
prohibition. Part IV looks to the French approach to the headscarf
problem, distinguishes it from the German situation and philosophy
of church-state separation, and recommends distance from the
French approach. Finally, Part V concludes that the Federal
Constitutional Court failed in its Headscarf Decision to come to a
solution for the problem of teachers wearing headscarves in public
schools and that the issue will thus surely come before the court
again in the near future.
II. THE HEADSCARF DECISION
A. The History of the Headscarf Decision
The Headscarf Decision is the culmination of a six-year legal
battle fought by a Muslim school teacher, Fereshta Ludin, for the
right to wear her Islamic headscarf while teaching in a public school.
Ludin was born in Afghanistan but has lived continuously in
Germany since 1987, becoming a German citizen in 1995.31 In
1997, as Ludin neared completion of her pedagogical studies in
Stuttgart, the Stuttgart School Supervisory Authority [SSA]
[Oberschulamt Stuttgart] turned down her application for a position

29. Kruzifix-Urteil [Crucifix Decision] (May 16, 1995), BVerfGE 93, 1.
30. For an overview of the Crucifix Decision, see VON CAMPENHAUSEN, LAW OF
CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 1, at 64, 76 (listing relevant sources); see also Christoph Link,
Der Streit um das Kreuz—Trendwende in der Rechtsprechung? [The Conflict Surrounding the
Cross—A Reversal of the Trend in Caselaw?], KUR 2002, 101. For an American treatment of
the case in English, see Lark E. Alloway, Comment, The Crucifix Case: Germany’s Everson v.
Board of Education?, 15 DICK. J. INT’L L. 361 (1997).
31. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (284), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 2.
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as a student teacher.32 The Land Minister of Education, Annette
Schavan, a Christian Democrat, intervened on Ludin’s behalf in this
instance to allow her to finish her studies.33 Upon completion of her
studies in 1998, the Stuttgart SSA denied her application for
employment in the state school system because of her “lack of
personal qualifications.”34 Specifically, Ludin continued to insist on
wearing a headscarf, even while teaching.35 On July 15, 1998, the
parliament of Baden-Württemberg, the Land encompassing
Stuttgart, expressly decided not to enact a general legislative
prohibition on wearing a headscarf while teaching.36 Shortly
thereafter, Ludin appealed the administrative denial of her
application for employment, thus inaugurating her legal battle with
Baden-Württemberg.
Ludin’s case failed at all levels of administrative appeal: she
would not be found eligible to teach in the public schools so long as
she uncompromisingly refused to remove her headscarf while
teaching. On August 14, 1998, Ludin made an internal appeal of the
initial administrative denial of her application for employment to the
SSA.37 She argued that “wearing a headscarf is not only a
characteristic of her personality, but is also an expression of her
religious conviction. According to the precepts of Islam, wearing a
headscarf is part of her Islamic identity.”38 The SSA rejected this
internal appeal on February 4, 1999.39 The SSA first reasoned that
paragraph 3 of article 33 of the Basic Law40 indeed prohibited
32. Kopftuchstreit: Chronik der Ereignisse [Headscarf Debate: Sequence of Events],
SPIEGEL ONLINE, Sept. 24, 2003, at http://www.spiegel.de/unispiegel/studium/0,1518,
266936,00.html [hereinafter Sequence of Events] (on file with the BYU Law Review).
33. Id.
34. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (284), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 3
(“mangelnder persönlicher Eignung”).
35. Sequence of Events, supra note 32.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (284), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 4 (“das
Tragen des Kopftuchs sei nicht nur Merkmal ihrer Persönlichkeit, sondern auch Ausdruck ihrer
religiösen Überzeugung. Nach den Vorschriften des Islam gehöre das Kopftuchtragen zu ihrer
islamischen Identität.”). In the Headscarf Decision, the Federal Constitutional Court
conveniently summarized all of the holdings below and serves as a reference to the holdings of
the lower courts.
39. Sequence of Events, supra note 32.
40. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 33, para. 3, English translation available at
http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/eurodocs/germ/ggeng.html (“Enjoyment of civil and civic
rights[,] eligibility for public office, and rights acquired in the public service are independent of
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denying an employment application because of religious affiliation
alone but then concluded that the same did not exclude the
possibility of considering a lack of qualifications for working in the
civil service based on an applicant’s religion.41 The SSA then
admitted that wearing a headscarf fell within the protections of
article 4 of the Basic Law42 but based its denial of her application on
the idea that “[t]he religious freedom of the complainant is limited
by the fundamental right of the students to negative religious
freedom, the parent’s right of upbringing from paragraph 2 of article
6, as well as by the state’s obligation to religious and worldview
neutrality.”43
Ludin appealed this SSA decision to the Stuttgart Administrative
Court, which rejected her complaint on March 24, 2000. The
Stuttgart Administrative Court held that “[w]earing a headscarf for
religious reasons by a teacher constituted a lack of qualification in
the sense of section 11, paragraph 1 of the Baden-Württemberg’s
Law on State Civil Servants” because of the interplay between the
teacher’s religious freedom and the neutrality of the state, on the one
hand, and the rights of the students and parents on the other.44
Next, Ludin appealed this rejection of her complaint to the
Baden-Württemberg Court of Administrative Appeals, the Land
administrative appellate court, which upheld the Stuttgart
Administrative Court’s denial of Ludin’s complaint on June 26,
2001.45 The Court of Administrative Appeals pointed out that an
religious denomination. No one may suffer disadvantage by reason of his adherence or nonadherence to a denomination or ideology.”).
41. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (285), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 5.
42. Article 4 of the Basic Law provides that
(1) Freedom of faith and of conscience, and freedom of creed religious or ideological, are
inviolable.
(2) The undisturbed practice of religion is guaranteed.
(3) No one may be compelled against his conscience to render war service as an armed
combatant. Details will be regulated by a Federal law.
GG art. 4.
43. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (285), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 5 (“Die
Religionsfreiheit der Beschwerdeführerin werde durch das Grundrecht auf negative
Religionsfreiheit der Schülerinnen und Schüler, das Erziehungsrecht der Eltern aus Art. 6
Abs. 2 GG sowie die Verpflichtung des Staates zu weltanschaulicher und religiöser Neutralität
aber eingeschränkt.”).
44. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (285), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 6 (“Das
religiös motivierte Tragen eines Kopftuchs durch eine Lehrerin stelle einen Eignungsmangel
im Sinne des § 11 Abs. 1 Landesbeamtengesetz Baden-Württemberg (LBG) dar.”).
45. VGH Baden-Württemberg, NJW 54 (2001), 2899.
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appellate court has limited powers of review in an administrative
decision about whether an applicant is qualified for a job.46
Nevertheless, the Court of Administrative Appeals highlighted the
problem of allowing a teacher to wear a headscarf while teaching:
“[w]earing a headscarf while teaching could influence the students
religiously and could lead to conflicts within the affected
classrooms.”47 The headscarf constituted a religious symbol “which
the observer [in the school classroom] cannot avoid.”48 But Ludin
was not satisfied with these justifications of the regulation
prohibiting her from wearing a headscarf while teaching and
appealed this decision of the Land Court of Administrative Appeals
to the Federal Administrative Court in Berlin.
Ludin was no more successful in the Federal Administrative
Court than she had been in the courts below. The Federal
Administrative Court in Berlin rejected Ludin’s complaint,49
explaining that “[l]imitations [of an individual’s religious freedom]
arise from the Basic Law itself, particularly from colliding
fundamental rights of those who believe differently.”50 In fact, the
religious freedom guaranteed by the Basic Law necessitates some
such limitations, especially in the context of public schools in the
name of the state’s mandated religious neutrality.51 In short,
The right of the teacher to act according to her convictions must
retreat from the competing religious freedom of the students and
parents while teaching. Neither the requirement of toleration nor

46. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (286), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 8
(summarizing the Baden-Württemberg Court of Administrative Appeals’s reasoning).
47. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (287), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 11 (“Das
Tragen des Kopftuchs durch eine Lehrerin im Unterricht könne zu einer religiösen Beeinflussung
der Schüler und zu Konflikten innerhalb der jeweiligen Schulklasse führen . . . .”).
48. Id. (“dem sich der Betrachter nicht entziehen könne”).
49. Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court], NJW 55
(2002), 3344 (upholding the administrative prohibition on teachers wearing a headscarf in
public state schools).
50. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (288), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 13
(“Einschränkungen ergäben sich aus der Verfassung selbst, insbesondere aus kollidierenden
Grundrechten Andersdenkender.”).
51. Id. (“In dem vom Staat organisierten und gestalteten Lebensbereich der
bekenntnisfreien Pflichtschule komme Art. 4 Abs. 1 GG freiheitssichernde Bedeutung
vornehmlich zugunsten der schulpflichtigen Kinder und ihrer Eltern zu. . . . Kinder seien in
öffentlichen Pflichtschulen ohne jegliche Parteinahme des Staates und der ihn
repräsentierenden Lehrkräfte für christliche Bekenntnisse oder für andere religiöse und
weltanschauliche Überzeugungen zu unterrichten und zu erziehen.”).
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the principle of practical harmony compel the conclusion that the
parent’s right to the upbringing of their children and the religious
freedom of the parents and the children must be repressed in favor
of a teacher who wears a headscarf.52

In response to these results in the administrative courts, Ludin
entered a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court alleging
that the administrative regulation of the SSA prohibiting her from
wearing a headscarf while teaching violated her fundamental rights
under the Basic Law.53 Unlike the administrative courts that
uniformly rejected Ludin’s complaints, the Federal Constitutional
Court ruled the prohibition as promulgated and implemented by the
SSA legally insufficient54 to deprive Ludin of her religious freedom.55
But this holding is infirm because of its lack of guidance and the
political controversy it has aroused.
B. The Majority Opinion in the German Headscarf Decision
The Federal Constitutional Court found Ludin’s complaint that
the school authorities and the administrative courts had violated her
right to religious freedom to be valid. Accordingly, the court found
that the statutory scheme in place in Baden-Württemberg’s existing
laws did not provide a “sufficiently clear legal basis”56 upon which to
use an administrative decision to prohibit wearing headscarves while
teaching. Proceeding from article 33, paragraph 2 of the Basic
Law—under which every German enjoys equal access to every public
office according to his eligibility, ability, and professional
qualifications—the court noted that this access to employment in the
civil service can indeed be limited by subjective acceptance criteria, as
provided, for example, in the Law on Guidelines for Employment in
the Civil Service [Beamtenrechtsrahmengesetz] and the Laws on State

52. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (289), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 14.
53. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (289), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 16.
54. See infra note 82 for a discussion of the principle that essential matters—such as the
limitation of a fundamental right—are reserved to democratically elected legislatures that create
the clear legal basis to guide any legislative delegation that results in the restriction of a
fundamental right.
55. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (303), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3114), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 49.
56. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (294), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3111), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 30.
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Civil Servants [Landesbeamtengesetzen].57 In setting these criteria, the
lawmaker has wide discretion.58 According to the court, the exercise
of a fundamental right, such as the right to freedom of religious
expression, by a civil servant while at work can be limited by the
general demands of the position or by special requirements of the
public office in question.59 Even in the prognostic decision on the
future official activities of someone applying for a position, the state
as an employer still has wide discretion that can only be reviewed
narrowly by the courts.60
But in the Headscarf Decision problems arose from article 4 of
the Basic Law, whose scope in protecting religious freedom the court
recapitulated based on earlier decisions. The religious freedom
ubiquitously guaranteed by article 4 also encompasses the right to
profess and to preach one’s faith61 and to base all of one’s behavior
on the teachings of one’s religion. Religious convictions that dictate
one behavior as the correct way to cope with circumstances are also
protected by article 4.62 Because the article 4 rights of religious
57. The Court conceded that “[i]n principle, the lawmaker has wide discretion in
setting eligibility criteria for a particular position in the civil service and in defining the job
description against which to judge the qualifications of an applicant for that position.”
Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (296), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3111), 2 BvR
1436/02, para. 34 (“Der Gesetzgeber hat bei der Aufstellung von Eignungskriterien für das
jeweilige Amt und bei der Ausgestaltung von Dienstpflichten, nach denen die Eignung von
Bewerbern für den öffentlichen Dienst zu beurteilen ist, grundsätzlich eine weite
Gestaltungsfreiheit.”). Compare Decision of May 22, 1975, BVerfGE 39, 334 (370)
(upholding loyalty to the state as an eligibility requirement for employement in the civil
service), with Beamtenrechtsrahmengesetz [BRRG] [Law on Guidelines for Employment in
the Civil Service] § 7, v. 31.3.1999 (Bundesgesetzblatt [Federal Gazette] I S. 654), and
Landesbeamtengesetz Baden-Württemberg [LBG] [Law on State Civil Servants BadenWürttemberg] § 11, para. 1, v. 19.3.1996 (Gesetzblatt [Legal Gazette] S. 286).
58. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (296), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3111), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 34.
59. Id. (citing Decision of Feb. 25, 1981, BVerwGE 56, 227).
60. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (296), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3112), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 35; cf. Decision of May 27, 1992, BVerwGE 86, 244; Decision of Dec.
18, 1984, BVerwGE 68, 109; Decision of Oct. 19, 1982, BVerwGE 61, 176 (186); Decision
of May 22, 1975, BVerfGE 39, 334 (354) (holding that a court can only narrowly review
eligibility for employment in the civil service decision by the state).
61. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (297), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3112), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 37; cf. Decision of Oct. 16, 1968, BVerfGE 24, 236 (245) (holding that
article 4 of the Basic Law not only guarantees the freedom to have or not to have religious
convictions but also the freedom to teach and spread such convictions).
62. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (297), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3112), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 37; cf. Decision of Dec. 17, 1975, BVerfGE 41, 29 (49) (reasoning that
article 4 of the Basic Law not only prohibits the state from intruding into the area of an
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freedom are guaranteed unconditionally,63 any limitations on these
rights must also arise directly from the Basic Law.64 “In addition, the
limitation of the unconditionally guaranteed freedom of religion
requires a sufficiently clear legal basis.”65 Accordingly, any limitation
of article 4 rights is subject to especially strict justification demands.
The court considered wearing a headscarf to be a right protected
by article 4’s guarantee of religious freedom. The court rightly
supported its position on the subjective conviction of the
complainant and not on the question of whether Islam generally and
universally requires women to wear a headscarf.66 In any event,
according to the court, it is enough if the obligation to wear a
headscarf can plausibly fall under article 4.67 Incidentally, all earlier
courts had also reached this conclusion in an unobjectionable way.
As other constitutional rights that might potentially collide with the
right to religious freedom, the court identified the state educational
mandate,68 the parents’ right to upbringing,69 and the negative

individual’s religious freedom but also requires positive action on the part of the state to allow
for the active exercise of one’s convictions); Decision of April 11, 1972, BVerfGE 33, 23 (28)
(stating that religious freedom guarantees more than just the freedom to believe or not to
believe what one wishes—it also guarantees that right to orient one’s entire behavior to the
tenets of one’s faith and to act according to one’s convictions); Decision of Oct. 19, 1971,
BVerfGE 32, 98 (106) (noting that freedom of religion in Germany also protects religious
convictions that determine a certain way to react to situations in life as the best way to
overcome such circumstances even if the religion does not demand such behavior).
63. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (297), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3112), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 38.
64. Id.; cf. Decision of May 26, 1970, BVerfGE 28, 243 (260) (holding that limitations
on the right to conscientious objection cannot be justified based merely on laws, norms, and
institutions, but rather can only be justified on colliding fundamental rights of third parties);
see also Crucifix Decision (May 16, 1995), BVerfGE 93, 1 (21) (same).
65. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (297), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3112), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 38 (citing Decision of Nov. 27, 1990, BVerfGE 83, 130 (142)).
66. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (298–99), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3112), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 40; see also Martin Heckel, Religionsfreiheit und Staatskirchenrecht in der
Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Religious Freedom and Church-State Law in the
Jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court], in 2 BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT
FESTSCHRIFT 379, 393 (2001).
67. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (299), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3112), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 40.
68. GG art. 7, para. 1 (“The entire education system is under the supervision of the
state.”).
69. GG art. 6, para. 2 (“Care and upbringing of children are the natural right of the
parents and a duty primarily incumbent on them. The state watches over the performance of
this duty.”).
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religious freedom of the schoolchildren.70 But the court then applied
the religion/worldview neutrality required of the state only to the
state itself and not to representatives of the state—e.g., public school
teachers—who parents and schoolchildren admittedly cannot choose
themselves.71 The court straightforwardly explained that the
necessary latitude for the active exercise of one’s religious convictions
and the realization of one’s autonomous personality or individuality
also belong under article 4’s protections:72
The State singly may not exercise a conscious influence for the
benefit of a specific political, ideological, or worldview perspective,
or identify itself either expressly or impliedly with a particular faith
or worldview through measures that either proceed from it or that
are attributed to it and thereby endanger the religious peace in
society.73

Similarly, aside from the obligatory nature of public school, the court
noted that, irrespective of their negative religious freedom, students
and parents do not have the right to avoid confrontation with
foreign confessions of faith, acts of worship, and religious symbols.74
The court recognized in detail the right of the Länder to create
the public school system and to ban improper influences from
schools. The religiously motivated clothing of a teacher, which also
may be interpreted as a statement of a teacher’s religious convictions,
could also have this effect, according to the court.75 With reference
to the distinction used by the police between abstract and concrete
danger, the court found that a teacher wearing a headscarf in an
obligatory state school only entails an abstract danger—only the
possibility of harm or a conflict. But the limitation of an

70. GG art. 4, para. 1 (“Freedom of faith and of conscience, and freedom of creed
religious or ideological, are inviolable.”); see also Crucifix Decision (May 16, 1995), BVerfGE
93, 1 (4), (21–24) (ruling that Bavarian Land regulations requiring crucifixes to hang in
classrooms in public schools violated students’ negative religious freedom, or the freedom not
to adopt a certain belief).
71. See Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (299–300), NJW 56 (2003), 3111
(3112–13), 2 BvR 1436/02, paras. 42–43.
72. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (300), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3113), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 43.
73. Id.
74. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (301–02), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3113), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 46.
75. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (303), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3114), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 49.
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unconditionally guaranteed fundamental right requires a sufficiently
clear legal basis, which the court found missing in this case, in part
apparently supported by this standard from the police of a lack of
concrete danger posed by a teacher wearing a headscarf.76 That is,
even though the applicant made clear from the beginning that she
was not willing to comply with the headscarf prohibition, the court
only found this to constitute an abstract possible danger which did
not justify the current intrusion into this fundamental right.77 The
court considered the fact that no tangible clues were visible to
identify any concrete danger.78 Future conflicts will thus need other
regulations.79 Furthermore, the teachers’ general obligations of
restraint did not substantiate a policy prohibiting the wearing of
certain clothing or other symbols at school.80 But the court found
that the Land legislatures were free to provide the previously missing
legal basis for such a prohibition by reevaluating, within the
framework of the constitutional requirements, the allowable degree
with which references to religion may appear in the school.81 This
would put an applicant on notice (as they were already) that
eligibility for employment in this field might be denied if the
applicant reveals from the beginning that he or she cannot adopt the
required restraint, for example, by not committing to refrain from
wearing such symbols.
The Federal Constitutional Court’s approach to the issue of
teachers wearing an Islamic headscarf in public school is significantly
flawed. Legally, the determining factor for the Federal Constitutional
Court was that the question of eligibility for employment in the civil
service cannot be decided by an administrative education authority
familiar with the problem, although that has previously been the case
with generally satisfactory results. The court held that the
Wesentlichkeitstheorie, or “theory of essentiality,”82 demands that
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (308), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3115), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 60.
81. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (309), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3115), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 62.
82. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (312), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3116), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 69. The Wesentlichkeitstheorie is a principle of German constitutional and
administrative law concerning the legality of administration. Two main principles govern the

680

VCAM-FIN

665]

7/3/2004 2:07 PM

The German Headscarf Debate

democratically elected legislators issue these types of regulations
because they have an assessment prerogative at their disposal, unlike
administrators and judges.83 In fact, the court reasoned that agencies
and courts could not claim such a prerogative for themselves.84
Specifically, the court substantiated this position with the principles
of parliamentary reservation of material issues [Parlamentsvorbehalt],
the constitutional state founded on the rule of law
[Rechtsstaatsprinzip],85
and
the
democratic
imperative

legality of administrative acts in the Federal Republic of Germany. First, the “priority of
statute” [Vorrang des Gesetzes] “means that administrative decisions must never contravene
statutes, since the latter have been passed by a democratically elected body. Thus
administrative actions are bound by the law and must be fully reviewable by the courts.”
NIGEL G. FOSTER & SATISH SULE, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LAWS 165 (3d ed. 2002).
Second, the principle of “statutory reservation” [Vorbehalt des Gesetzes], which gives rise
to the Wesentlichkeitstheorie, “requires a legal basis whenever the executive takes administrative
action, especially when restricting the citizen’s basic rights but also when granting rights to the
individual.” Id. Thus, “the principle of ‘statutory reservation’ goes beyond the first principle:
The executive is not only prohibited from contravening existing legal provisions when acting.
Rather, it needs a legal basis to act . . . . [This is because] all actions of the executive must be
democratically justified and foreseeable by the citizen.” Id. In this context, the
Wesentlichkeitstheorie is a rule created in the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court
“according to which essential matters have to be regulated by Parliament.” Id. The Court
found this rule necessary to help distinguish between delegated legislation covered by the
principle of statutory reservation and “parliamentary reservation” [Parlamentsvorbehalt]:
[T]he more essential a matter is for the citizen and the public the more detailed
Parliament’s regulation has to be on this matter, leaving less discretion to
administrative decisions when implementing the statute. . . . [I]t has at least been
generally accepted that matters which are of importance to the individual’s
enjoyment of basic rights are “essential matters.” Therefore they must be decided
upon by Parliament and cannot be left to delegated legislation.
Id. at 165–66.
83. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (310), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3116), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 66.
84. Id.; cf. Decision of March 1, 1979, BVerfGE 50, 290 (332); Decision of March 2,
1999, BVerfGE 99, 367 (389).
85. It is true that “[t]he principle of Rechtsstaat is often translated as rule of law,”
however, “such a translation can be misleading.” FOSTER & SULE, supra note 82, at 163. That
is, “[t]he term itself . . . indicates the supremacy of law (Recht) within the state (Staat)” which
indeed at first closely resembles the essence of the “British rule of law.” Id. But the term
Rechtsstaat also includes a substantive component missing in the British rule of law: “[T]he
experiences of the Third Reich have shown that formal Acts of Parliament do not necessarily
safeguard against blatantly unjust and inhumane measures taken by the state against
individuals.” Id. For this reason, “the principle of Rechtsstaat now also includes a substantial
element” which means that “state authorities such as [the] judiciary and the executive are not
only bound by Acts of Parliament (Gesetz) but also [by] ‘the law’ (Recht) meaning ‘substantial
rightness and justice’ as expressed by fundamental constitutional values, namely the basic
rights.” Id. at 163–64.
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[Demokratiegebot].86 In order to realize fundamental rights, the
court held, the controlling regulations must be laid out in law.87 In
any case, the lawgiver is committed to determine on its own the
contours of conflicting guaranteed freedoms as far as such a
determination is material for the exercise of these freedoms.88 The
court noted that the power to limit fundamental freedoms and to
balance colliding fundamental rights are powers reserved to the
parliament under the Basic Law.89 This applies especially to schools,
the court found, where the teachers’ obligations have previously not
been sufficiently defined.90
The Headscarf Decision will result in further heated political
arguments. Such controversy is even more likely since the court
uncharacteristically failed to provide instruction as to what such a
valid regulation should contain.91 The court might have made this
omission because none of the numerous other courts (including the
Federal Administrative Court) or the Land legislatures had treated
the problem and the prevailing principle in the debate about these
questions in quite this way before. One more problematic aspect of
the court’s decision is that it does not grant an adequate transition
period for the Länder to develop a new constitutionally sufficient
legal basis for a headscarf prohibition.92 This has created a legal
vacuum: between the day of the Decision and the forthcoming and
possibly conflicting regulations currently being developed in the
Länder, a public school teacher may not be prohibited from wearing
86. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (311), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3116), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 67.
87. Id. The democratic imperative [Demokratiegebot], the Rechtsstaatsprinzip, and the
parliamentary reservation [Parlamentsvorbehalt] together “require that essential matters cannot
be regulated by delegated legislation but have to be dealt with by Parliament itself.” FOSTER &
SULE, supra note 82, at 196. See supra note 82 for a brief summary of the legality of
administrative acts and the Wesentlichkeitstheorie.
88. Id.; cf. Decision of Nov. 27, 1990, BVerfGE 83, 130 (142).
89. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (312), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3116), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 68; cf. Decision of March 25, 1992, BVerfGE 85, 386 (403).
90. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (312), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3116), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 69.
91. See, e.g., Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (302–03), NJW 56 (2003), 3111
(3113–14), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 47 (noting merely that, in creating a sufficiently clear legal
basis for a prohibition, a Land can consider certain factors such as the colliding rights at issue,
the school tradition in that Land, and the denominational composition of the local population,
but failing to list concrete criteria that would assure the validity of a new prohibition).
92. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (338), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3121–22), 2
BvR 1436/02, paras. 134–35 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting).
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a headscarf while teaching. Neither the case law nor the academic
literature to date suggest that a civil servant’s official duties must be
established by law if they relate to religious freedom, as noted by the
sounder dissenting opinion.
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Substantively, the dissenters in the Headscarf Decision
emphasized the role a teacher plays as a representative of the state. In
this context, the dissent notes the significance of the fact that
“whoever wishes to become a civil servant freely chooses to side with
the state.”93 Thus, “right from the beginning, teachers who are civil
servants, by their status as civil servants, do not enjoy the same
protection of their fundamental rights as do parents and
schoolchildren. Rather, teachers are bound to fundamental rights
because they take part in the exercise of public power.”94 The
relationship of a teacher to the state is an exceptionally close one.95
Still, the teacher in the capacity of teacher is not a mere “executive
instrument” [Vollzugsinstrument] of the state by nature of this
relationship.96 Nevertheless,
[h]e who wishes to become a civil servant must nevertheless
identify himself with the constitutional state in important
fundamental questions and in the performance of his official
responsibilities because the State is also represented by the official
service of the teacher and therefore is identified with the actual
individual so serving. All principles of the civil service are governed
by this idea of mutuality and proximity.97

Essentially, the civil servant, properly understood, waives his or
her constitutional rights that are not compatible with the position of
93. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (315), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3117), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 77 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting) (“Wer Beamter wird,
stellt sich in freier Willensentschließung auf die Seite des Staates.”).
94. Id. (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting).
95. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (317), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3117), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 81 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting).
96. Id. (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting).
97. Id. (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting) (“Wer Beamter werden will, muss
sich jedoch mit dem Verfassungsstaat in wichtigen Grundsatzfragen und bei der
Wahrnehmung seiner dienstlichen Aufgaben loyal identifizieren, weil umgekehrt auch der Staat
durch seinen öffentlichen Dienst repräsentiert und deshalb mit dem konkreten Bediensteten
identifiziert wird. Von dieser Idee der Gegenseitigkeit und der Nähe sind alle Grundsätze des
Berufsbeamtentums beherrscht.”).
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civil service at issue—here, teachers in a public, obligatory state
school. “The majority did not take sufficient account of this
structural difference” between the relationship of a normal citizen to
the state and that of a civil servant.98
The dissenting opinion also criticizes the court’s apparent
equation of the eligibility determination in the framework of the
special equality clause in article 33, paragraph 2 of the Basic Law—
which guarantees all citizens equal access to employment in the civil
service—with state interference with religious freedom guaranteed by
article 4, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law.99 The conflation of these two
constitutional provisions is novel and cannot be allowed.100 In
contrast, according to the dissent, the intrusion by the state into the
sphere of normal citizens is normally a prerequisite for a claim that
such classic rights and freedoms have been violated.101 But the
dissent points out that, in the case of a civil servant job applicant in a
public school (i.e., a teacher) the state is not intruding into the
sphere of ordinary citizens; rather, a bearer of fundamental rights is
seeking affiliation with the state apparatus and thus associates with
the
state,
or
the
fundamental
rights
addressee
102
[Grundrechtsadressaten]. However, the dissent notes that a civil
servant’s freedom while in service is limited from the beginning by
the nature of the circumstances and, above all, by the constitutional
form of the office.103
Finally, the dissent sharply criticizes another aspect of the court’s
opinion that bears mention here as problematic. The dissent notes
that the court seems to ignore clear constitutional mandates in
finding that the regulatory prohibition on wearing a headscarf while
teaching does not proceed from a “sufficiently clear legal basis”104
98. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (316), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3117), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 79 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting).
99. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (318–19), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3117–
18), 2 BvR 1436/02, paras. 84–87 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting).
100. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (318), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3118), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 85 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting).
101. Cf. id. (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting).
102. Id. (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting).
103. Id. (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting).
104. Cf. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (306), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3115), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 57 (establishing that there was not a “sufficiently clear legal basis” for the
administrative decision that Ludin was not qualified according to the eligibility criteria for
employment in the civil service because of her continued refusal to teach without her
headscarf).
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and in finding that in order to prohibit teachers from wearing
headscarves, the Länder needed to legislate and create a “sufficiently
clear legal basis.”105 But the Basic Law itself provides the legal
basis106 for a determination that a civil servant who categorically
refuses to remove a headscarf while on the job does not meet the
eligibility criteria for employment in the civil service.107 Thus,
“[u]ncompromisingly insisting on wearing a headscarf while teaching
in a public school, as the complainant has done, is not compatible
with the [constitutional] imperative of moderation and neutrality
required of a civil servant.”108
III. ANALYSIS OF THE FLAWED MAJORITY OPINION
IN THE HEADSCARF DECISION
A. Why the Court Got It Wrong
At first glance, the Headscarf Decision seems to be doctrinally
consistent with case law. Existing case law has long merited the
approval of relevant academic literature. The Decision confirms, in
the first place, previous arguments in case law109 and literature for
religious/worldview neutrality in the sense of openness and
promotion110—in contrast to the French type of exclusionary laicism,
or secularization, that is not and should not be valid in Germany.111
In the Headscarf Decision, the court has reemphasized the legal
equality of all religions and worldviews, but has also indicated that
not every kind of behavior of an individual, as subjectively

105. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (320), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3118), 2
BvR 1436/02, paras. 90–91 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting).
106. GG art. 33, para. 2; see also Decision of Feb. 21, 1995, BVerfGE 92, 140 (151);
Decision of July 8, 1997, BVerfGE 96, 189 (197).
107. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (320, 323–25), NJW 56 (2003), 3111
(3118–19), 2 BvR 1436/02, paras. 90, 97–101 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting).
108. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (325), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3119), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 102 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting).
109. Compare Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (297–300), NJW 56 (2003),
3111 (3112–13), 2 BvR 1436/02, paras. 37–42, with Decision of Dec. 17, 1975, BVerfGE
41, 29 (49); Decision of April 11, 1972, BVerfGE 33, 23 (28); Decision of Oct. 19, 1971,
BVerfGE 32, 98 (106).
110. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (299–300), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3112–
13), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 42.
111. See infra text accompanying notes 149–71 for a discussion of the French approach
to religious neutrality and why Germany should not ascribe to it.
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interpreted by that individual to be an expression of protected
religious freedom, can be seen as such.112 The court demands
plausibility in order to find any given behavior within the protected
realm of freedom of religion and conscience.113 But despite
appearance to the contrary, the Headscarf Decision leaves a
conflicting impression in many ways.
1. Deciding not to decide
The court conspicuously avoids taking a position on a religious
question in the Decision by returning the issue to the Land
legislatures.114 This is reminiscent of two recent reactions by the
court to questions of religious freedom. First, the court avoided
adjudicating the merits of such a question in the case concerning the
Land of Brandenburg’s worldview and ethics course known as
LER.115 In the LER case, the Land Brandenburg was accused of
violating the state’s obligation to religious/worldview neutrality
because the “religious sciences” [Religionskunde] aspect of the LER
curriculum was considered generally hostile toward religion.116 The
LER case ended with a court-suggested settlement after the court
granted the Land five years to dismantle its controversial position,
thus never proceeding to a judgment on the merits.117 Second, the
court’s Kosher Butcher Decision118 concerned a prohibition on
slaughtering animals without anesthesia for religious reasons. In the
Kosher Butcher Decision, the court simply passed the problem of

112. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (298), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3112), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 40 (“nicht jegliches Verhalten einer Person allein nach deren subjektiver
Bestimmung als Ausdruck der besonderen geschützten Glaubensfreiheit angesehen werden
könne”).
113. Id.
114. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (302–03, 309), NJW 56 (2003), 3111
(3113, 3115), 2 BvR 1436/02, paras. 47 & 62–63.
115. “Lebensgestaltung-Ethik-Religionskunde” [Life Orientation–Ethics–Religious Sciences].
See generally LER Decision (Oct. 31, 2002), BVerfGE 106, 210; Hans Marcus Heimann,
Ethikunterricht im religiös und weltanschaulich neutralen Staat [Ethics Lessons in a
Religious/Worldview Neutral State], ZEVKR 48 (2003), 17.
116. Heimann, supra note 115, at 17.
117. Id. at 17 n.1.
118. Schächt-Urteil [Kosher Butcher Decision] (Jan. 15, 2002), BVerfGE 104, 337; see
also Nina Arndt & Michael Droege, Das Schächturteil des BVerfG—Ein „Dritter Weg” im
Umgang mit der Religionsausübungsfreiheit [The Kosher Butcher Decision of the Federal
Constitutional Court—A “Third Way” in the Interaction with the Free Exercise of Religion],
ZEVKR 48 (2003), 188.
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protecting animal welfare on to the Executive, which the court
charged to ensure that animal welfare interests be observed in
individual cases “through side determinations and by supervision of
their observance as well as through examination of expert studies and
the personal qualification of the claimant also in relation to the
particular skills required for kosher butchering.”119 The court
proceeded in a similar responsibility-shifting fashion in the Headscarf
Decision.
There has apparently never been an attempt to challenge the
constitutional protection of wearing a headscarf for religious reasons
under the protections of the free exercise of religion. Even civil
servants are permitted to wear headscarves in public while not
working. The only point of contention is whether this freedom is
restricted while engaged in the civil service. To this extent, the
Headscarf Decision offers little new insight. As expressed by the
dissenting opinion, “[t]he court has failed its duty to answer a basic
constitutional question even though that case was justiciable.”120 The
German news magazine Der Spiegel formulated it much more
concisely: the court has unfortunately “decided not to decide.”121
2. Contradicting prior case law and departing from foundational
principles
In addition to shifting responsibility, the Headscarf Decision also
contradicts prior case law. The court has previously emphasized the
primacy of protecting children and teenagers from various dangers to
their development.122 It was in this vein that the court issued its
Crucifix Decision.123 This line of reasoning played no part in the

119. Id. at 348 (“durch Nebenbestimmungen und die Überwachung ihrer Einhaltung
ebenso wie bei der Prüfung der Sachkunde und der persönlichen Eignung des Antragstellers
auch in Bezug auf die besonderen Fertigkeiten des Schächtens”); see also Karl-Hermann
Kästner, Das tierschutzrechtliche Verbot des Schächtens aus der Sicht des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[The Animal Welfare Prohibition on Kosher Butchering from the Perspective of the Federal
Constitutional Court], JZ 57 (2002), 491.
120. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (337), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3121), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 133 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting) (“Der Aufgabe, eine
verfassungsrechtliche Grundsatzfrage zu beantworten, ist der Senat nicht gerecht geworden,
obwohl der Fall entscheidungsreif ist.”).
121. Dominik Cziesche et al., Das Kreuz mit dem Koran [The Cross with the Qur’an],
DER SPIEGEL, Sept. 29, 2003, at 82.
122. Decision of Nov. 27, 1990, BVerfGE 83, 130 (140).
123. Crucifix Decision (May 16, 1995), BVerfGE 93, 1.
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Headscarf Decision. But a piece of clothing conspicuously displayed
by a teacher for religious reasons arguably makes a bigger impression
than does the familiar symbol of a cross or crucifix. A crucifix or
cross typically hangs on the wall with no missionary intentions,
hanging instead as a simple “trademark” of a constitutionally
permitted type of school.124 Even though the cross does not appear
in certain schools for religious reasons, but rather may appear as a
cultural symbol and trademark of a type of school and its curriculum,
the court unduly complicated “learning under the cross”125 in the
Crucifix Decision.
Wearing a headscarf, by contrast, is seen in the Headscarf
Decision as possibly meaning something very different,126 even
though no one doubts that the teacher in this case wore a headscarf
as a manifestation of her religious convictions. Additionally, the
court does not discuss the perception horizon of the children at the
developmental age who are obligated to go to school. Quoting itself,
the court notes that, in a society that gives room to different
religious convictions, there is no right “to be spared contact with
different religious statements, rites, and symbols,”127 but then leaves
the actual problem unsolved. This is not about people being exposed
to religious impressions on the street, but rather it concerns “a
situation created by the state in which the individual is exposed to
the influence of a specific faith, to the actions in which this faith
manifests itself, and to the symbols in which this faith is
represented.”128 It is surprising that the court does not discuss
further the extent to which the state can legally force parents to

124. Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, Offene Fragen im Verhältnis von Staat und Kirche
am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts [Open Questions in the Relationship Between Church and State at
the End of the Twentieth Century], ESSGESPR. 34 (2000), 105, 110.
125. See Karl-Hermann Kästner, Lernen unter dem Kreuz? Zur Zulässigkeit religiöser
Symbole in staatlichen Schulen nach der Entscheidung des BVerfG vom 16. Mai 1995 [Learning
Under the Cross? On the Permissibility of Religious Symbols in Schools After the Decision of the
Federal Constitutional Court of May 16, 1995], ZEVKR 41 (1996), 242.
126. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (303–05), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3114), 2
BvR 1436/02, paras. 50–52.
127. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (302), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3113), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 46 (“von fremden Glaubensbekundungen, kultischen Handlungen und
religiösen Symbolen verschont zu bleiben”); see also Crucifix Decision, BVerfGE 93, 1, 15.
128. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (302), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3113–14), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 46 (“eine vom Staate geschaffene Lage, in welcher der Einzelne ohne
Ausweichmöglichkeit dem Einfluss eines bestimmten Glaubens, den Handlungen, in denen
dieser sich manifestiert, und den Symbolen, in denen er sich darstellt, ausgesetzt ist”).
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expose children to a religious influence conveyed by a headscarf by
means of general compulsory education.
Finally, the foundational principles regarding the legal position
of civil servants are completely repealed with this Decision. The
relationship between article 33, paragraph 3 and article 4, paragraphs
1 and 2 of the Basic Law, the applicability of fundamental rights to
the law governing civil servants, determinations of qualification, and
eligibility for employment in the civil service according to article 33,
paragraph 3 of the Basic Law are all abolished with the comment
that fundamental rights are of ultimate importance.129
3. Catering to politics and special interests
Fundamental political decisions are also at play in this Decision,
and these must be dissimulated. It is not the case that three or five
percent of the population of Germany is Muslim; rather, in some
parts of Germany that number is sixty or ninety percent.130 Behind
these Muslims, as behind the claimant teacher in the Headscarf
Decision, stand powerful special interest groups that have expressed
their desire to change society.131 Allowing teachers to wear
headscarves will not be the end of it; these special interest groups will
only stop once they have effected change in all social institutions:
state registrars, judges, and policewomen, all who insist on wearing
headscarves, and even possibly policemen with turbans. These are the
problems that lurk in the background. In this respect, this Decision
is not helpful but ominous. To this extent, one must also question
the comments about neutrality in the Decision. The objective effect
of this Decision is that the state appears to identify itself with the
teacher who functions by mandate of the state and in its name not
only in the content and nature of the lessons that she teaches, but
also in the striking potential effect of her religiously toned clothing.
We do not need to decide what to do with nuns and monks who are
so often and gladly mentioned in this context because they uniformly
appear in their respective manner of dress in private parochial
schools; otherwise we would have had corresponding cases and

129. Cf. Böckenförde, supra note 28 (employing the same logic as the Federal
Constitutional Court in a discussion of the Decision of Oct. 16, 2000, in the Administrative
Trial Court of Lüneburg, NJW 54 (2001), 767).
130. BUNDESTAGSDRUCKSACHE 14/4530, at 9.
131. Id. at 66.
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treatments in the relevant academic literature decades ago in
Germany.132 Under these circumstances, it is even perplexing that the
majority opinion in the Headscarf Decision speaks only generally
about a “piece of clothing” [Kleidungsstück] and compares this with
a simple Christian or Muslim piece of jewelry on a necklace. In this
respect, the court surpasses even France’s laïcité,133 which exempts
normal pieces of jewelry that are not ostentatiously large from the
prohibition of religious symbols at school.
B. Why the Dissent Got It Right
In accord with the dissenting opinion,134 it is crucial to
distinguish between citizens who are subject by law to compulsory
education in public schools on the one hand, and applicants for
positions as teachers who have voluntarily chosen to become part of
the state apparatus as civil servants in those state schools, on the
other. Previously—and irrespective of differing legal rationales—it
was undisputed that a civil servant could not rely to the same extent
on the effect of fundamental rights that guarantee freedom as could
the normal citizen.135 A citizen’s fundamental rights are directed
against the state, and the school teacher, as part of the state
apparatus, is a primary addressee of that citizen’s fundamental rights.
Naturally, the teacher also has fundamental rights. The teacher’s
rights are not dismissed out of hand. But they experience a limitation
in the interest of the civil servant’s position; the extent of the
limitation depends on the nature of the office in question. Teachers
carry their own pedagogical responsibility, not in the cognition of
their own freedom, but rather on behalf of the state and under its
control. The dissenting opinion expresses this idea.
The Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court does not
dispute this in any way. The court merely explains that the
formulation of the duties of civil servants cannot be substantiated by
state administrative channels, as has previously been the case. The
actual loser in this Decision, therefore, is the state administration.
132. See generally ERWIN FISCHER, VOLKSKIRCHE ADE! TRENNUNG VON STAAT UND
KIRCHE [VOLKSKIRCHE ADE! THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE] (4th ed. 1993).
133. See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of French secular humanism, or laïcité.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 93–108.
135. See, e.g., Decision of Dec. 21, 1977, BVerfGE 47, 46; Decision of June 22, 1977,
BVerfGE 45, 400; Decision of Jan. 27, 1976, BVerfGE 41, 251; Decision of Dec. 6, 1972,
BVerfGE 34, 165.
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The court is demanding a shift of importance from the executive to
the legislative branch.136 The court does not dispute that the state
regulates the uniform loyalty to the law and the constitution of the
administration with the duties of civil servants in the domestic
sphere. The only question is how far the state regulation must go;
that is, how much discretion does the hiring official in the field have?
The scope of civil servants’ fundamental rights has been
hammered out in the debate surrounding what has previously been
termed
“special
relationships
of
power”
[Besondere
Gewaltverhältnisse]. But the term “special relationship of power”
became uncommon in constitutional jurisprudence because a relation
of power can be associated with a contradiction to a relationship of
law [Rechtsverhältnis].137 That is why other terms became
common—without harming the substantive meaning—such as
“special relationships of law” [Sonderrechtsverhältnisse], “special
connection” [Sonderbindung], “heightened relationship of
dependence”
[gesteigertes
Abhängigkeitsverhältnis],
“special
relationship of duties” [besonderes Pflichtenverhältnis], and “special
status” [Sonderstatus]. All of these terms still describe relationships of
law “that are characterized by an especially close connection of the
individual who stands in such a position through state power.”138
The relationship of the civil servant and the school always appears
next to the relationship of the soldier and of the prisoner to the state
in this context of special relationships that might affect the
fundamental rights of those involved in the relationships.
Undoubtedly, fundamental rights are still valid even in these
special relationships.139 But the nature of their validity constitutes a

136. Cf. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (336), NJW 56 (2003), 3111 (3121), 2
BvR 1436/02, para. 131 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting).
137. Wolfgang Loschelder, Grundrechte im Sonderstatus [Fundamental Rights in the
Special Status], 5 HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS [HANDBOOK OF STATE LAW] § 123 n.6
(1992); see also KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZÜGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY] marginal no. 321 (20th ed. 1995).
138. 1 INGO VON MÜNCH, GRUNDGESETZKOMMENTAR [COMMENTARY ON THE BASIC
LAW] Vorb. arts. 1–19, marginal no. 59 (5th ed. 2000); see also CHRISTIAN STARCK, in 1
GRUNDGESETZKOMMENTAR [COMMENTARY ON THE BASIC LAW] art. 1, marginal no. 255
(Von Mangoldt et al. eds., 4th ed. 1999).
139. See Loschelder, supra note 137, § 123 n.6; see also HESSE, supra note 137, at
marginal no. 321. Older legal perspectives were overcome especially in the jurisprudence of the
Federal Constitutional Court. See, e.g., Strafgefangenen-Entscheidung [Prisoner Decision]
(Mar. 14, 1972), BVerfGE 33, 1. For expressions of this change in the area of public schools,
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legal problem. Here we are obviously dealing with legal relationships
that demand a special type of protection of freedom since their
nature differs from the general relationship of citizens to the state. It
would exceed the comprehensive legal bounds of state power if
fundamental rights could be restricted arbitrarily or by discretion in
such relationships of special status. Therefore, in the words of the
Federal Constitutional Court, even in such special relationships, a
restriction of fundamental rights may be considered
only if the restriction is indispensable for the achievement of the
community oriented goals covered by the value regime of the Basic
Law and in constitutional forms provided for there. . . . Thus, it
may only occur through a law or on the basis of a law . . . , which
will, however, not be able to dispense with blanket clauses that are
as narrowly tailored as possible.140

Examples of such “constitutional forms” provided for in the
Basic Law for justifying restrictions of fundamental rights within
these special relationships include constitutional determinations for
the military,141 for the establishment of the civil service,142 for the

see Decision of Oct. 20, 1981, BVerfGE 58, 257; Decision of Dec. 21, 1977, BVerfGE 47,
46; Decision of June 22, 1977, BVerfGE 45, 400; Decision of Jan. 27, 1976, BVerfGE 41,
251; Decision of Dec. 6, 1972, BVerfGE 34, 165.
140. Prisoner Decision, BVerfGE 33, 1 (11) (“nur dann in Betracht, wenn sie zur
Erreichung eines von der Wertordnung des Grundgesetzes gedeckten gemeinschaftsbezogenen
Zweckes unerläßlich ist und in den dafür verfassungsrechtlich vorgesehenen Formen
geschieht. . . . also nur durch Gesetz oder auf Grund eines Gesetzes . . . , das allerdings auf—
möglichst eng begrenzte—Generalklauseln nicht wird verzichten können”).
141. GG art. 17a. This article provides:
(1) Laws concerning military services and alternative service may by provisions
applying to members of the Armed Forces and of alternative services during their
period of military or alternative service, restrict the basic right freely to express and
to disseminate opinions by speech, writing, and pictures (Article 5, paragraph (1)
first half-sentence), the basic right of assembly (Article 9), and the right of petition
(Article 17) insofar as it permits to address requests or complaints jointly with
others.
(2) Laws for defense purposes, including the protection of the civilian population
may provide for the restriction of the basic rights of freedom of movement (Article
11) and inviolability of the home (Article 13).
142. GG art. 33, paras. 4–5. These paragraphs determine that
(4) The exercise of state authority as a permanent function shall as a rule be
entrusted to members of the public service whose status, service and loyalty are
governed by public law.
(5) The law of the public service shall be regulated with due regard to the traditional
principles of the permanent civil service.
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public school system,143 and for the penal system.144 Thus, the scope
of fundamental rights is restricted by general rules in these “state
internal areas” [staatlichen Innenbereichen] of particular obligation.
Naturally, the restriction will conform to the characteristics of the
particular state-organized sphere.
Case law has deepened the legal questions surrounding the
relationships of special status. Until recently, many have taken for
granted that only “material” questions regarding these relationships
should be reserved for the legislature.145 Certain specific duties are
circumscribed by these general rules even in civil service and
education law. However, details about the specific duties necessarily
rest with administrative bodies.
The headscarf conflict repeats this debate about what role the
legislature plays in this context, and the court has apparently
assumed the equality of the fundamental rights of civil servants, on
the one hand, and of citizens who are subject to state compulsion

143. GG art. 7. This article concerns the State’s role in education in Germany:
(1) The entire education system is under the supervision of the state.
(2) The persons entitled to bring up a child have the right to decide whether they
shall receive religious instruction.
(3) Religious instruction forms part of the ordinary curriculum in state and
municipal schools, excepting secular schools. Without prejudice to the state’s right
of supervision, religious instruction is given in accordance with the tenets of the
religious communities. No teacher may be obliged against his will to give religious
instruction.
(4) The right to establish private schools is guaranteed. Private schools as a
substitute for state or municipal schools, require the approval of the state and are
subject to the laws of the Laender. This approval must be given if private schools are
not inferior to the state or municipal schools in their educational aims, their facilities
and the professional training of their teaching staff, and if a segregation of the pupils
according to the means of the parents is not promoted. This approval must be
withheld if the economic and legal position of the teaching staff is not sufficiently
assured.
(5) A private elementary school shall be admitted only if the educational authority
finds that it serves a special pedagogic interest or if, on the application of persons
entitled to bring up children, it is to be established as an interdenominational or
denominational or ideological school and a state or municipal elementary school of
this type does not exist in the community.
(6) Preparatory schools remain abolished.
144. GG art. 74, no. 1 (“Concurrent legislative powers extend to the following matters:
1. civil law, criminal law and execution of sentences, the system of judicature, the procedure of
the courts, the legal profession, notaries and legal advice . . . .”).
145. Decision of Dec. 21, 1977, BVerfGE 47, 46 (78–79); Decision of June 22, 1977,
BVerfGE 45, 400 (417); Decision of Jan. 27, 1976, BVerfGE 41, 251 (259); Decision of Dec.
6, 1972, BVerfGE 34, 165 (192).
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(students in obligatory schools, prisoners in the penal system,
etc.),146 on the other. It seems to me that rather than equating the
fundamental rights of these two, the court should have counted
teachers as representatives of those owing fundamental rights and
not as those who possess claims for freedom that are generally
directed against the state. I also question whether it is helpful in a
system such as the public school system to reserve material questions
of education law to the legislature under the theory of essentiality
[Wesentlichkeitstheorie].147 The result will be a de facto limitation of
the freedom of those subject to state compulsion in these areas and
for whose benefit the theory of essentiality—the legal reservation of
material questions to the legislature—has been expanded into
education law. It has the effect of making obligatory state schools
available to teachers as a stage on which they can develop their
personalities through constitutionally protected fundamental rights,
independent of the democratically determined school system.
German schools have not experienced problems in this area before;
contrary to many of its neighbors, Germany enjoys peace at
school.148
IV. HEADSCARVES IN FRANCE
Understandably, an investigation of the headscarf debate shifts
from Germany to France.149 The headscarf has been the cause of
disturbance and controversy in the public schools in France for
approximately the last twenty years. And as recently as February 10,
2004, a so-called laïcité law has passed the National Assembly in its
first reading. It might seem at first blush that Germany could profit

146. For a general treatment, see Böckenförde, supra note 28.
147. For a discussion of the Wesentlichkeitstheorie, or the “theory of essentiality,” see
supra note 82 and sources cited there.
148. Compare infra Part IV for a treatment of the situation in France.
149. See Werner Heun, Die Religionsfreiheit in Frankreich [Religious Freedom in France],
ZEVKR 49 (2004), 273; cf. Brigitte Basdevant-Gaudemet, Staat und Kirche in Frankreich
[Church and State in France], in STAAT UND KIRCHE IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION
[CHURCH AND STATE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION] 127 (Gerhard Robbers ed., 1995); René
Metz, Staat und Kirche in Frankreich. Auswirkungen des Trennungssystems—neuere
Entwicklungstendenzen [Church and State in France. Effects of the System of Separation—New
Developmental Trends], ESSGESPR. 6 (1972), 103. See generally AXEL FRHR. VON
CAMPENHAUSEN, STAAT UND KIRCHE IN FRANKREICH [CHURCH AND STATE IN FRANCE]
(1962), also published in French as L’ÉGLISE ET L’ÉTAT EN FRANCE (1964).
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from the experiences in France. But this is not so since the systems
differ so widely from each other.150
A. Background to France’s Approach to the Headscarf Problem
According to its Constitution of 1958, the French Republic is a
secular republic, “une République . . . laïque.” A radical separation
of church and state has prevailed for the last one hundred years in
France.151 The reasons for this stem from an understanding of the
laicism, or the secularism, that banished religion from the public
sphere and state institutions, especially from the public schools, and
that prescribed ignoring religion and oppressing its expression.152
While religious freedom reigns in Germany and every individual has
the right “to orient his whole bearing on the teachings of his faith
and to act according to his inward and outward faith and
convictions,”153 French law relegates the exercise of religion to the
private sphere. Accordingly, even Muslim schoolchildren in France
have been forbidden to express their religious conviction as
adherents of Islam by wearing a headscarf.
It is difficult to understand this radically different state of affairs
between Germany and France without some historical insight.154
Ultra-Catholic and anticlerical excesses had ruptured French society
since the French Revolution.155 The separation law of December 9,
1905,156 was meant to take care of this poisoning conflict once and
for all by forbidding any sort of recognition or support of churches

150. VON CAMPENHAUSEN, LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 1, at 393–407.
151. See generally Von CAMPENHAUSEN, supra note 149.
152. Id. at 86–113.
153. Decision of Oct. 19, 1971, BVerfGE 32, 98 (106) (“sein gesamtes Verhalten an den
Lehren seines Glaubens auszurichten und seiner inneren und äußeren Glaubensüberzeugung
gemäß zu handeln”); see also Decision of Oct. 16, 1968, BVerfGE 24, 236 (246).
154. See generally VON CAMPENHAUSEN, LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 1, at
393–407. See also the recent sources listed in Heun, supra note 149.
155. CULTURE WARS. SECULAR-CLERICAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
EUROPE (Christopher Clark & Wolfram Kaiser eds., 2003); STATHIS N. KALYVAS, THE RISE
OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE (1996); HUGH MCLEOD, RELIGION AND THE
PEOPLE OF WESTERN EUROPE 1789–1989 (1997).
156. Loi du 9 décembre 1905 [Law of Dec. 9, 1905], C. adm. 787 (Fr.) (23rd ed. 1994)
[hereinafter Law of 1905], reprinted in German in GIACOMETTI, QUELLEN ZUR GESCHICHTE
DER TRENNUNG VON KIRCHE UND STAAT [SOURCES ON THE HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION
OF CHURCH AND STATE] 272 (1926); see also Hanna Clayson Smith, Comment, Liberté,
Egalité, et Fraternité at Risk for New Religious Movements in France, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1099,
1106–08 (introducing the Law of 1905).
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by the state and by declaring anything religious to be a private
matter.157 This approach overlooked the fact that, while the state and
church institutions can indeed be totally separated, this does not
work for people because an individual can be both a citizen and a
member of a religion.158 Even the external disentanglement
produced unanticipated problems. For example, the cathedrals and
churches nationalized during the French Revolution are still owned
by the state even today. They are carried by the state but used by the
Catholic Church.159 Should they be closed? This was actually
threatened at one point.160 This and many other repugnant
developments were gradually curbed by thoughtful adjudication,
especially by the Conseil d’État.161 The principle of radical laicism, or
secularization, transformed into the more moderate principle of
laïcité,162 which in many respects corresponds to the concept of
neutrality in matters of religion and worldview.
The present situation in France is livable, since legal or merely
factual breaches of the hallowed state-separation principle have
mitigated its restrictions on religious freedom. Such breaches of the
strict principle include, among other things, public schools granting
one free day per week for the purpose of making it possible for
students to obtain religious education outside of school. The
situation has also been relaxed by the emigration of a large portion
of society out of the public schools and into private, state-subsidized
parochial schools. This accords with the modern understanding of
religious freedom but not with the secularization principles of the

157. Metz, supra note 149, at 103.
158. Id.
159. For this reason, the financing prohibition contained in the Law of 1905 could not
be complied with in the manner prescribed in the law from the very beginning. Further
ruptures have come in the course of the last ninety-nine years. See A. BOYER, LE DROIT DES
RELIGIONS EN FRANCE [THE RIGHT OF RELIGIONS IN FRANCE] 126 (1993); BasdevantGaudemet, supra note 149, at 141.
160. The closing of these churches was prevented at the last minute by the Law of Jan. 2,
1907, which hardly revealed that something substantive was being revised. See VON
CAMPENHAUSEN, supra note 149, at 7–9.
161. Id. at 116.
162. For a succinct definition of laïcité, see Smith, supra note 156, at 1102 n.11
(“Translated literally from the French, laïcité means ‘secularism.’ Others have translated laïcité
to mean the French idea of ‘secular humanism,’ which embodies a set of political,
philosophical, and, often, antireligious principles.” (citations omitted)); see also Jean Baubérot,
Secularism and French Religious Liberty: A Sociological and Historical View, 2003 BYU L. REV.
451; Jacques Robert, Religious Liberty and French Secularism, 2003 BYU L. REV. 637.
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separation law of 1905, which have never been abrogated.163 Rather,
these principles live on latently in French society. Thus, laicism, or
secularization, continues to pose a threat as an exclusionary principle
that curtails religious freedom.164
Jacques Chirac, the French President, clearly demonstrated the
potential threat of France’s latent laicism in his speech of December
17, 2003. In the name of toleration and religious freedom, President
Chirac rose up the standard of laïcité and demanded respect for it.165
In doing so, he did not appeal to what Germans refer to as the
religious/worldview
neutrality
[die
religiös-weltanschauliche
Neutralität] of the schools; rather, he plead for a conception of
public schools as a type of republican taboo zone, a “sanctuary”166
from which anything religious should be completely banned.
In this context, the new direction of recent French legislation
belongs in the gestalt of the so-called laïcité law. Previously, the
French legislature had hid behind the Conseil d’État, France’s
preenforcement constitutional court. But the Conseil d’État has
emphasized the principle of religious freedom and has only
disallowed the wearing of headscarves in public school buildings
when accompanied by provocative behavior.167 Schoolmasters had
been given broad discretion to decide individual cases as they came
up.168 But the pressure of militant Islamic organizations and the
threat of Islamicization have caused headmasters to shrink from the
responsibility of suspending such students from school. It is on this
background that the French are creating this new laïcité law.
B. Germany Should Not Take the French Approach
The legal situations in France and Germany are fundamentally
different. In Germany, which in comparison to other European
163. See Metz, supra note 149, at 142–43.
164. See VON CAMPENHAUSEN, supra note 149, at 156; Heun, supra note 149, at 283;
Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, „Laizismus,” in 1 EVANGELISCHES STAATSLEXIKON col. 1951
(3d ed. 1987).
165. See Respekt der Laizität [Respect Laïcité], FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG
FRANKFURT GENERAL NEWSPAPER], Jan. 29, 2004.
166. Id.
167. Theodore Dalrymple, France’s Headscarf Problem, CITY J., Apr. 23, 2003, at
http://www.city-journal.org/html/eon_4_23_o3td.html.
168. Nicht überall ein Konfliktstoff [Not Everywhere Material for Conflict], SPIEGEL
ONLINE, Sept. 24, 2003, at http://www.spiegel.de/unispiegel/studium/0,1518,266948,
00.html (on file with the BYU Law Review).
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countries has long been a model country in the field of religious
freedom,169 such mismatched fragments from the French experience
cannot be simply adopted, especially since France espouses a more
limited concept of religious freedom.170 The separation of church
and state—that is, the autonomy and independence of state and
church institutions—has thrived in Germany since 1919. In
Germany, both church and state work together to further the
citizens’ interest in matters that intersect the responsibilities of both
institutions. This was prescribed by the Weimar Constitution of
1919 as much as it is by the Basic Law of today.171 Furthermore, the
German prohibition on teachers wearing headscarves underscores the
religious/worldview neutrality of the state—in this instance in the
form of a teacher as the representative of the state school authority.
France, on the contrary, is regulating the apparel of the
schoolchildren and engaging in semantic subtleties to differentiate
between jewelry and other adornments that are to be either allowed
or disallowed in the future. It should not go that far in Germany.
V. CONCLUSION
The Land legislatures, which want to secure peace in their
respective Länder by maintaining the status quo of not allowing
teachers to wear headscarves, are not to be envied in their task. In
contrast to other decisions, the court here provides no criteria by
which a legislature may correctly enact a prohibition after striking
down the administrative regulation employed by the state of BadenWürttemberg as insufficient to create a sufficient legal basis.172 New
problems will also arise from the demand for concretization of

169. AXEL FRHR. VON CAMPENHAUSEN, 6 HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [HANBOOK OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY] § 136, marginal n. 6 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds.,
unrevised 2d ed. 2001).
170. Heun, supra note 149, at 273, 276–79.
171. Christoph Link, Ein Dreivierteljahrhundert Trennung von Kirche und Staat in
Deutschland [Three-Quarters of a Century of the Separation of Church and State in Germany],
in FS THIEME 98 (1993). For a discussion of the principle differences in the systems of
separation in France, the United States, the former eastern bloc, and Germany, see VON
CAMPENHAUSEN, LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 1, at 393–407. See generally Axel
Frhr. von Campenhausen, Die Trennung von Staat und Kirche in Deutschland und das
kirchliche Selbstbestimmungsrecht [The Separation of Church and State in Germany and the
Churchs’ Right of Self Determination], ZEVKR 47 (2002), 359–68.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 91–92.
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constitutional limitations in new laws.173 In the interest of equality,
the different branches of the administrative state must be provided
with specific regulations as well. Restrictions on religious freedom
that are necessary in the civil service will then have to be weighed
against the individual’s claim to fundamental rights. The equality
issue sharpens the problem “because the legislative branch will have
to develop consistent substantive distinguishing criteria for specific
provisions that will need to include certain branches of the civil
service, for example teachers, differently than other civil servants.”174
Thus, it is true that a treatment providing a satisfactory result for
problematic cases always becomes more complicated in the future.
Previously, the administrative apparatus has been charged with
determining the legal qualification and eligibility of applicants for
positions in the civil service. It is unclear how a legislature—which is
now required to formulate generally applicable and abstract
regulations on the eligibility of civil servants for employment by the
state—can be expected to do a better job of it. “An increase in legal
certainty and equity in individual cases can hardly result from this
Decision.”175

173. Cf. Headscarf Decision, BVerfGE 108, 282 (336–37), NJW 56 (2003), 3111
(3121), 2 BvR 1436/02, para. 131 (Jentsch, Di Fabio & Mellinghoff, dissenting) (criticizing
the majority for demanding the Länder to legislate in an area in which they explicitly did not
want to legislate and that the new law must “concretize constitutional limitations” without
giving any criteria by which to do so).
174. Karl-Hermann Kästner, Darf eine muslimische Lehrerin im Unterricht das Kopftuch
tragen? Anmerkung zum Urteil des BVerfG vom 24.9.2003 [May a Muslim Schoolteacher Wear a
Headscarf While Teaching? Commentary on the Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of
Sept. 24, 2003], JZ 58 (2003), 1178 (1180) (“denn die Legislative muss für spezifische
Vorschriften, welche einzelne Zweige des öffentlichen Dienstes, wie beispielsweise die
Lehrerschaft, anders erfassen sollen, als sonstige öffentliche Bedienstete, konsistente sachliche
Differenzierungskriterien entwickeln”).
175. Id. (“Ein Zuwachs an Rechtssicherheit und Einzelfallgerechtigkeit dürfte sich
hierdurch schwerlich ergeben.”).
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